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The dilemma for the university is distressing but straight-
forward: do we accept a fall in quality as the public subsidy
diminishes yet again, or seek flexibility to match the student
contribution to the real cost of delivering tertiary education and
address inadequacies in the current system? This question is
bigger than fee levels, since it goes to a status quo already riddled
with inequitable distribution of available public funding.
Students and staff alike hold dear the importance of univer-
sities to the nation, and the overriding importance of adequate
public funding. Those running our universities feel likewise the
responsibility of ensuring the highest-quality university possible.
It is not in students’ interests to reduce the quality of their
education to avoid unpopular fee rises. This is a choice no one
welcomes, but a question we cannot avoid.
The University of Melbourne is a public-spirited university
committed to excellence in research, teaching and learning and
engagement. In the best of all possible worlds, that mission
would be proudly and unstintingly supported by the nation. Our
reality, alas, makes for harder choices.
First rule of fighting
terrorists: don’t do 
their job for them
Daniel Baldino
It appears that Australia might be put on a higher threat alert
level. ASIO director-general David Irvine’s comments on a possi-
ble increase in the terrorism threat level (which came into force
in 2003) have created a wave of flurry, concern and nervous
anticipation. As Irvine explained:
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Questions of Leadership
The notion of a threat level at medium is that an
attack is possible or could occur. If we raise it to high
it means an attack is likely.
Certainly, a fundamental security challenge is how intelligence
and police agencies can best deal with potential home-grown
terrorists and their allies. For instance, Britain has raised its
threat level to “severe” in response to events in Iraq and Syria. So
how should the Australian government and its citizens best
respond?
Back to the future
Despite Osama Bin Laden receiving a bullet to the head in May
2011 and a weakened al-Qaeda — which is on the run and
characterised by paralysis, incompetence and infighting —
Australia’s terrorism threat level is potentially poised to rise from
medium to high for the first time since inception.
This seems to revolve around deteriorating conflicts in the
Middle East, the evils of Islamic State (IS) and Sunni militia
groups, and salvos about “Aussie jihadists”. About 60 Australians
are reportedly fighting in either Iraq or Syria.
Yet every measure put forward to manage the threat of
citizens being involved with extremist groups abroad should not
be understood as automatically acceptable or validated. A plausi-
ble strategy for countering IS has not yet been clearly articulated.
And talking more openly about the greatest sources of funding
for IS, including the role of Saudi Arabia, would inject a bit more
honesty and intricacy into the debate.
It is worth noting that over that past decade many have
argued that Australia’s decision to join the US invasion of Iraq in
2003 was never a straightforward “mission accomplished”.
Rather, it ultimately exacerbated existing ethnic and religious
tensions, in turn making Australia less safe from terrorism.
It directly led to the “balkanisation” of Iraq. Adding insult to
injury, purported WMDs eventually stood for “weapons of mass
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disappearance”, while the dictator Saddam Hussain had no direct
relationship with the tragedy of 9/11.
The “Team Australia” narrative
This has been a muddying period of scatter-gun political
exchanges, mixed security narratives and gloomy media reporting.
We have, for instance, had the Abbott government insist that
renewed or enlarged participation in military operations in Iraq
and Syria will not put Australia at increased risk. Yet both intelli-
gence agencies and government have been anxious to win
support for expanded powers under new security legislation.
Similarly, while team Abbott has appeared eager to focus on
an escalating terrorist situation at home and abroad, security
assessments have not been in lock-step with political attempts to
jump-start a new dialogue of national security menace. The
threat status remained stubbornly unchanged.
This might change. Yet the stronger terror assessment
scenario painted by ASIO does seem rather odd. Irvine chose to
speculate publicly about the threat alert being raised to the
second-highest level, ostensibly before giving formal advice to
the government.
Based on ongoing assessments, either a threat is likely to
occur or it is not. If so, why the delay? If not, why prematurely
raise a “worst-case” scenario? Citizens remain stuck in terror
limbo.
Further, this drip-feed of vague warnings is being packaged
by policymakers with a hyper-legislative insistence on introduc-
ing another round of “tough” terror laws. While some measures
appear justifiable — such as up-to-date powers to suspend
passports — many others do not. Some proposals remain decid-
edly inconsistent with past recommendations by watchdogs like
the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor.
Overall, it can be argued that many shortcomings and the
lack of  practical fine-tuning evident in core elements of
35
Questions of Leadership
Australia’s counter-terrorism legislation are the result of undue
haste. Governments have rushed to pass laws without appropri-
ate scrutiny and related checks and balances. We seem to be stuck
on a rinse-and-repeat cycle to keep terrorising ourselves.
A fine line between public alert and panic
The head of ASIO publicly musing about terror threats has
undoubtedly had a virtually identical impact to the anticipated
actual adjustment (or non-adjustment) of  the National
Terrorism Public Alert System. It has grabbed headlines and
accelerated political chatter and public speculation.
Problematically, this has created rolling confusion. Much
work remains to be done to keep uncertainty about terrorism in
perspective.
The alert system has limited usefulness in guiding people’s
movements. It is not tied to any specific action — unless self-
imposed and completely arbitrary.
Do we stay home? Do we avoid public transport or airports
or crowded movie theatres or the AFL finals series? Do we shun
strangers with beards? Do we re-read (or re-find) our Howard
government-issued fridge magnets for instructions while setting
our mobile phones to automatically dial the terrorist hotline
when our spider-sense tingles (sorry, I can never remember the
number)?
This type of “alert and alarmed” scenario tends to lead in a
couple of directions: it either creates wider public paranoia or
greater public scepticism. Neither is particularly helpful for an
effective, sustainable and clear-eyed counter-terrorism strategy.
Serving the terrorists’ agenda
A variety of policymakers and media are doing their best to
contribute to the manipulation of revived fears about terrorism.
Social media in particular have become highly effective in
spreading violent extremist ideology and propaganda. Brutal
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decapitations such as that of American journalist James Foley are
instantaneously available worldwide.
But imagine that the most effective weapon against the West
for the IS is actually terror. Imagine that terrorists are hoping to
provoke shock and fear; they aim to terrorise. Imagine that these
ugly videos are entirely ineffective in changing the direction of
the US in its involvement with expanded air campaigns and
drone strikes against IS.
That would leave the only substantial impact these behead-
ings can have on Western audiences as a psychological one of
building IS into a sort of shadowy, omnipresent super-villain
that is hell-bent on world domination.
Yet the noise emanating from IS is mostly crude bluff and
ludicrous chest-beating. It is critical to match its well-echoed and
grandiose intentions with a calculation of its actual capacity to
form a self-proclaimed caliphate throughout the Middle East,
North Africa and large parts of western Asia and Europe. This
capacity is zero. It is based on an illusion.
IS is a threat to specific people in parts of Iraq and Syria. It
might dictate terms within some lawless and poorly defended
areas. But IS does not have the ability to march into Pakistan. Or
to take Baghdad (being “close” to Bagdad does not count). In
fact, this splinter movement has struggled to hold the riverside
town of Dhuluiya, which is part of a belt of Sunni Muslim towns.
IS is in ongoing battles not only with US hellfire missiles but
with rival jihadist, terrorist and rebel groups. As al-Qaeda
eventually realised, the IS brand of savagery and its core blood-
thirsty organisation will continue to alienate support from both
local and global Islamic communities.
In short, IS is a nasty piece of work, but it is not a global
game-changer.
Frustratingly, while making nonsensical noises about IS
power, reach and authority, it is head-shaking that the Prime
Minister would then reward IS propaganda by implying that
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such unbridled violence and accompanying beheadings could
happen on Australian soil before long.
The instinct to “do something” and heroic calls to strong
vigilant action might be good politics. However, such heavy-
handedness is a careless and unhealthy national security stratagem.
What next?
The bad news is that the conflict in Iraq and Syria will remain an
incubator for a new generation of terrorists.
While individual motivations and profiles will vary, foreign
fighters from all parts of the globe are joining the combat. The
problem of war travellers who go to fight in foreign locations
and return home after operating in radicalising environments is
a serious security challenge.
Issues like detaining or arresting citizens before they have
left for a conflict zone — without solid evidence — will continue
to be complicated.
The good news is that the threat of foreign fighters is both
manageable and marginal. The coherence and capabilities of the
IS splinter group should not be overstated.
Another bottom line is that these Australian foreign fighters
do not represent the wider Islamic community — IS is keen to
kill all Muslims who they deem to be “infidels”. (This makes
many calls for “community” solutions by the overwhelming
moderate Muslim majority in Australia overly simplistic.)
This is not a clash of civilisations. Australian citizens still
have more chance of being killed by bee stings or car crashes
than by a rare, albeit conceivable, home-grown terrorist attack.
Interestingly, former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger
recently warned that traditional state-based threats remain a
much more serious and long-term security headache:
I consider Iran a bigger problem than ISIS. ISIS is a
group of adventurers with a very aggressive ideology.
But they have to conquer more and more territory
before they can became a strategic, permanent reality.
Questions of Leadership
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The lesson is not to dismiss the IS threat but to respond in a
proportionate, carefully calibrated fashion, to avoid hyping
terror risks and to invest in smart counter-radical campaigns.
The building of public resilience — the ability of society to
restore calm and for citizens to adapt rationally to random
events and unexpected changes (from terror strikes to shark
attacks) — remains indispensable.
The more immediate hazard is pointless overreaction and
political exploitation of public fears. The build-up of these kind
of tensions have had a track-record of leading into knee-jerk and
totally counter-productive policy initiatives — like the unneces-
sary Iraq invasion of 2003. That had no clear national security
benefit and contributed to much of this latest mess.
National security gags on
media force us to trust
state will do no wrong
Rick Sarre
It has been said that the line between good investigative report-
ing and inappropriate journalistic prying is never clearly drawn.
Journalists usually complain long and hard when governments
intervene to move the line. So they will not be impressed with
what has happened this week.
In the shadow of the recent anti-terrorism raids across New
South Wales and Queensland, the Abbott government has passed
legislation (with Labor support) designed specifically to silence
those who would seek to report particular anti-terrorism
measures.
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